



















Objective probability and quantum fuzziness
U. Mohrhoff




This paper offers a critique of the Bayesian approach to quantum mechanics in
general and of a recent paper by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack in particular (to appear
in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: History and Philosophy of
Modern Physics). In this paper the Bayesian interpretation of Born probabilities
is defended against what the authors call the “objective-preparations view”. The
fact that Caves et al. and the proponents of this view equally misconstrue the
time dependence of quantum states, voids the arguments pressed by the former
against the latter. After tracing the genealogy of this common error, I argue that
the real oxymoron is not an unknown quantum state, as the Bayesians hold, but an
unprepared quantum state. I further argue that the essential roˆle of probability in
quantum theory is to define and quantify an objective fuzziness. This, more than
anything, legitimizes conjoining “objective” to “probability”. The measurement
problem is essentially the problem of finding a coherent way of thinking about
this objective fuzziness, and about the supervenience of the macroscopic on the
microscopic that it entails. A way of meeting this formidable challenge is proposed.
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1 Introduction
Fuchs (2003) and Caves, Fuchs, and Schack (2002a, 2002c) have made a less than com-
pelling case for a Bayesian interpretation of quantum-mechanical probabilities. This paper
offers a critique of their interpretation with particular focus on their recent paper (Caves
et al., in press, henceforth CFS).
CFS contrast their subjective take on certainty in quantum mechanics with what they
refer to as the “objective-preparations view” (OPV): the notion that a system’s quantum
state is determined by a sufficiently detailed, agent-independent classical description of
the preparation device, which is itself thought of as an agent-independent physical system.
After listing a number of points that are not at issue, Sec. 2 draws attention to a common
misconception, shared by both CFS and the OPV, which voids the arguments pressed
by CFS against the OPV. This misconception arises from a misconstrual of the time
dependence of quantum states (in the Schro¨dinger representation), which leads both CFS
and the proponents of the OPV to conceive of quantum states as evolving, which in turn
leads both to treat quantum-mechanical probabilities as absolute probabilities.
Section 3 traces the genealogy of this misconception.
According to quantum Bayesians (Peres, 2004; Fuchs and Shack, 2004), an unknown
quantum state is a contradiction in terms. Section 4 explains why the real contradiction
in terms is an unprepared quantum state. The Bayesian view of quantum-mechanical
probabilities hinges on this oxymoron. A completely prepared quantum state (not to
be confused with a pure state) assigns probabilities to the possible outcomes of possible
measurements on the basis of all relevant actual outcomes. Its indeterminacies do not
originate in anyone’s ignorance. A quantum state that fails to take account of all relevant
outcomes suffers from the same ignorance as the probability distributions of classical sta-
tistical mechanics, viz., ignorance of relevant facts.1 A quantum state that fails to take
account of all relevant outcomes (i.e., an “unprepared quantum state”), finally, is not a
quantum state at all; it is ignorance pure and simple. Quantum state assignments begin
with relevant facts. The laws of quantum mechanics encapsulate correlations between
measurement outcomes. They may be used to assign probabilities to possible measure-
ment outcomes on the basis of actual outcomes. Unless at least one actual outcome is
taken into account, they are useless.2
As Appleby (2005a) remarked, “[w]hereas the interpretation of quantum mechanics
1If the mere possibility of being infected by ignorance of this kind were a sufficient reason for char-
acterizing a quantum state as a belief of some agent, then even those states of a hypothetical classical
world that are represented by points in some phase space, should be characterized as beliefs of agents.
2The well-known hydrogen orbitals may serve to illustrate this point. We tend to think of them as
states that obtain, forgetting that they are predicated on the basis of the outcomes of a joint measure-
ment of (i) the atom’s energy, (ii) its total angular momentum, and (iii) one component of its angular
momentum. Without any input, there isn’t any output.
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has only been puzzling us for about 75 years, the interpretation of probability has been
doing so for more than 300 years.” Do we need to solve the mystery of probability before
we are in a position to solve the mystery of quantum mechanics? I think not. As far
as the interpretation of quantum mechanics is concerned, the question of why it is a
fundamentally probabilistic theory is more urgent than the question of what probabilities
are. Section 5 suggests that what has taken the place of subjective ignorance is an
objective fuzziness. Probabilities serve to define and quantify fuzzy observables.
In order to descry the fuzziness of observables and to understand its place in the world,
our “universe of discourse” must include the world’s constituents, whatever they are. This
does not mean that we have to postulate a cryptodeterminism a` la de Broglie–Bohm or to
transmogrify mathematical tools such as quantum states or quantum fields into bona fide
physical entities. Whatever can legitimately be said about the world’s constituents has to
be warranted by the quantum-mechanical probability assignments themselves, analyzed
in a sufficient variety of measurement contexts. The results of such analyses (Mohrhoff,
2000, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006a) are summarized in Sec. 6.
As soon as one starts thinking about the world’s constituents, one is confronted with
the measurement problem, which quantum information theorists tend to keep locked away
in a black box known as “the 1-qbit measurement gate”. The solution to this problem,
which is addressed in Sec. 7, calls for a rigorous definition of “macroscopic” and a new
way of thinking about the macroworld.
Arguably, all of quantum theory’s baﬄing features are subsumed and eclipsed by the
supervenience of the microscopic on the macroscopic. Molecules, atoms, and subatomic
particles are what they are because of what happens in the macroworld, rather than the
other way round, as we are wont to think. In the quantum world, to be is to be measured.
A property exists only if, only when, and only to the extent that its possession can be
inferred from an actual event. Section 8 proposes a paradigm that is capable of making
sense of this extraordinary state of affairs. The final section spells out the sense (or
senses) in which quantum-mechanical probabilities are objective, whatever the Bayesians
may say.
2 Absolute probabilities?
Before embarking on the critical part of this paper, I wish to point out where I agree with
the premises or conclusions of CFS, with a view to sharpening the focus on my concerns.
(1) The are no preassigned values to, and no instruction sets behind, quantum mea-
surement outcomes. This includes outcomes that are certain (i.e., for which the
prior probability and the empirical data yield a posterior probability equal to 1).
(2) There is nothing intrinsic to a quantum system, no element of reality, no objectively
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real property of the system, that guarantees a particular outcome of a quantum
measurement.
(3) There is no local and realistic explanation for the correlations predicted by quantum
mechanics.
(4) State assignment, including pure-state ones, lack objective status.
(5) The Born rule is not a rule for “setting” probabilities, but rather a rule for “trans-
forming or relating” them. The role of physical law, in a world that is quantum
mechanical, is to relate (or correlate) probabilities, not to determine them.
(6) The Bayesian interpretation of probability is superior to both the frequentist and
the potentiality/propensity interpretations.
The last item should forestall the drawing of wrong conclusions from the title of the
present paper. Relative frequencies, belonging as they do to the domain of facts or events,
are distinct from probabilities, and the interpretation of probabilities as potentialities
(Heisenberg, 1958; Shimony, 1989) or propensities (Gillies, 1973; Suppes, 1973; Giere,
1979; Popper, 2000) issues from the same misconception as the belief in ”elements of
physical reality” (Einstein, et al., 1935)—the misconception that quantum states evolve.
If quantum states are objective, they aren’t so in either of these senses.
A quantum state ρ(t) is an algorithm that serves to assign probabilities to the possible
outcomes of any measurement that may be made at the time t. Its time dependence is a
dependence on the time of the measurement to the possible outcomes of which it is used
to assign probabilities. It is not the time dependence of an evolving state of any kind.
This disposes of the question whether a quantum state has two modes of evolution or just
one; a quantum state has none. It also disposes of an argument by which CFS arrive at
the following conclusions:
In the objective-preparations view, a probability-1 outcome. . . corresponds to
a pre-existing property of the external world. (Caves et al., in press)
The objective-preparations view. . . is inconsistent with the idea that a quan-
tum state does not represent a property of the external world. (Caves et al.,
in press)
The argument starts out like this:
Let |ψ〉 be a state prepared by a preparation device, and consider the ob-
servable O = |ψ〉〈ψ|, which has eigenvalues 0 and 1. If the state is |ψ〉, a
measurement of O will give the outcome 1 with certainty. In the objective-
preparations view, this certainty is implied by the facts about the experimental
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setup, independently of any observer’s information or beliefs. Effectively, in
the objective-preparations view, it is a fact, guaranteed by the facts about
the experimental setup, that the measurement outcome will be 1. The mea-
surement outcome is thus objectively certain. Whatever it is that guarantees
the outcome, that guarantor is effectively an objective property. It might
be a property of the system alone, or it might be a property of the entire
experimental setup, including the system, the preparation device, and the
measurement apparatus. In any case, the guarantor is a property of the world
external to the agent. (Caves et al., in press)
Assuming that the OPV is correct, the question is: at what time does the external world
possess this property? At the time tP of the preparation of |ψ〉? At the time tM of the
measurement of O? At all times in-between? At no time in particular?
Imagine a scientist who performs a series of Z measurements on the same system
and each time gets the same outcome. Shouldn’t she be surprised that she obtains the
same outcome every time? Doesn’t this mean that it is a fact, rather than a mere belief,
that the outcomes of her experiment will all be identical to the first outcome? The
answer to the first question is easy: Surprised? To the contrary, she would bet her life
on it since, knowing that the system’s Hamiltonian was zero, she was certain that she
would get the same outcome every time. Given her knowledge of the facts, only getting
a different outcome would surprise her. The answer to the second question is similarly
straightforward. The scientist has put together her experience (in particular all relevant
previous measurement outcomes) and her knowledge of physics (in particular quantum
theory) to predict that all outcomes will be the same as the first. Why would she want
any further explanation? What could be added to her certainty? She has consulted the
world in every way she can; the world offers no further stamp of approval for her certainty
beyond all the factors that she has already considered.
The previous paragraph is a rephrasing of an argument given by CFS in defense of the
Bayesian interpretation of quantum-mechanical probabilities.3 Formulated in this way,
3Here is the original: “Imagine a scientist who performs a sequence of Z measurements on a qubit.
Quantum mechanics, plus his experience and prior judgment and perhaps the outcomes of a long sequence
of previous measurements, make him certain that the outcomes will all be “up”. Now he performs the
measurements, and he always gets the result “up”. Shouldn’t the agent be surprised that he keeps getting
the outcome “up”? Doesn’t this mean that it is a fact, rather than a mere belief, that the outcomes of
his experiment will be “up”?. . . The answer to the first question is easy: Surprised? To the contrary,
he would bet his life on it. Since the agent was certain that he would get the outcome “up” every time,
he is not going to be surprised when that happens. Given his prior belief, only observing “down” would
surprise him, since he was certain this would not happen, though nature might choose to surprise him
anyway. The answer to the second question is similarly straightforward. According to our assumption,
the agent has put together all his experience, prior beliefs, previous measurement outcomes, his knowledge
of physics and in particular quantum theory, all to predict a run of “up” outcomes. Why would he want
any further explanation? What could be added to his belief of certainty? He has consulted the world in
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it could just as well be a defense of the OPV. Because the first measurement outcome,
the laws of quantum mechanics, and the system’s Hamiltonian together guarantee the
outcomes of the subsequent measurements, the guarantor is definitely a property of the
world external to the agent. What does not follow is that this property is possessed at
the times of the subsequent measurements or (in the earlier context) at the time tM , let
alone during the entire interval [tP , tM ]. If a time can be attributed to the guarantor, it
is the time tP . (We obviously cannot attribute a particular time to the laws of quantum
mechanics themselves, including the Hamiltonian, whose time dependence reflects the
time dependence of changing classical boundary conditions.)
Apparently, then, both the proponents of the OPV and their Bayesian opponents
agree that if there is a guarantor beyond the outcome at tP , the laws of quantum me-
chanics, and the system’s Hamiltonian, then that must be temporally located at tM . It
is this non sequitur that makes CFS conclude that “in the objective-preparations view,
a probability-1 outcome. . . corresponds to a pre-existing property of the external world.”
This erroneous conclusion is also all there is to the claim that the OPV “is inconsistent
with the idea that a quantum state does not represent a property of the external world.”
Both the proponents of the OPV and their Bayesian opponents thus appear to be
committed to what may be called “the evolutionary paradigm”—the notion that physics
can be divided into a kinematical part, which concerns the description of a physical system
at an instant of time, and a dynamical part, which concerns the evolution of a physical
system from earlier to later times. The fact that the formulations of quantum mechanics
in terms of evolving constructs (observables or states) were found well before Feynman’s
propagator-based formulation, can be attributed to the dominance of this paradigm. Even
now, the wave function is widely regarded as the primary affair, which the propagator
〈xf , tf |xi, ti〉 serves to propagate through time a` la
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ψ(xf , tf) =
∫
dxi 〈xf , tf |xi, ti〉ψ(xi, ti). (1)
If one accepts this view, then one effectively believes in absolute probabilities. One
believes that probabilities are determined by quantum states, rather than that they are
determined by measurement outcomes via computational devices called “quantum states”.
One believes that quantum states exist even in the absence of measurements, which merely
contribute to determine them (if that). And if in addition one endorses the Bayesian
program, then one believes that quantum states exist in the absence of measurements
as prior probabilities in the beliefs of agents, and that measurements—at any rate, those
with known outcomes—merely contribute to determine them.
every way he can to reach this belief; the world offers no further stamp of approval for his belief beyond
all the factors that he has already considered.”
4In the case of a nonrelativistic system consisting of a fixed number n of particles, x stands for a set
of 3n coordinates.
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The alternative is to think of the laws of quantum mechanics as encapsulating cor-
relations between measurement outcomes—diachronic correlations between outcomes of
measurements performed on the same system at different times as well as synchronic cor-
relations between outcomes of measurements performed on different systems in spacelike
relation. We can use these correlations to assign probabilities to possible measurement
outcomes on the basis of actual measurement outcomes, just as in a hypothetical classical
world we can use the classical laws to predict later states on the basis earlier ones. Our
use of the correlations for the purpose of predicting probabilities may be considered sub-
jective, but the correlations themselves are as objective as the classical laws in a classical
world.
If the laws of quantum mechanics are essentially correlation laws, then all quantum-
mechanical probabilities are conditional, rather than absolute.5,6 While this chimes in
which CFS’s view that the Born rule is a rule for “transforming or relating” probabili-
ties, rather than a rule for “setting” them, it is at odds with their effectively absolutist
conception of probability, which requires a quantum state to exist as a prior belief in ad-
vance of any measurement, in spite of the fact that the truth value of a prior probability
assignment cannot be determined: “Any usage of probability theory starts from a prior
probability assignment. The question of whether a prior probability assignment is true or
false cannot be answered” (original emphasis).
This suggests to me an inconsistency in the Bayesian interpretation of quantum states.
It is not enough to replace the evolving states of nature of certain interpretations by
evolving states of belief. One must also get rid of the notion that quantum states evolve.
That, however, is made impossible by the Bayesian program, inasmuch as this cannot do
5The conditionality of quantum-mechanical probabilities has been stressed by Primas (2003), who has
drawn attention to an axiomatic alternative to Kolmogorov’s (1950) formulation of probability theory
due to Re´nyi (1955, 1970). Whereas in Kolmogorov’s theory absolute probabilities have primacy over
conditional ones, Re´nyi’s theory is based entirely on conditional probabilities. Primas states that every
result of Kolmogorov’s theory has a translation into Re´nyi’s.
6Matt Leifer (2006) tries to outfuchs Chris Fuchs by arguing that “if quantum states, including pure
states, are more like probability distributions than ‘states of reality’, then quantum operations, including
unitary ones, are more like conditional probabilities than objective dynamical laws and should likewise
be taken to be subjective.” (A quantum operation is the most general way of updating a quantum state.)
I concur that quantum states are “more like probability distributions”—they are devices for turning any
given measurement into a probability distribution over its possible outcomes: specify the measurement,
get the probabilities of its outcomes. I also concur that quantum operations are “more like conditional
probabilities than objective dynamical laws”—they condition the working of those devices on actual
measurement outcomes, in addition to taking care of the time spans between (a) the measurements on
the basis of whose outcomes probabilities are assigned, and (b) the measurement to the possible outcomes
of which probabilities are assigned. But I fail to see how the subjectivity of one leads to the subjectivity
of the other. A set of conditional probabilities (qua real numbers between 0 and 1) is one thing. A
machine for conditioning probabilities on (i) the time of the measurement to the possible outcomes of
which they are assigned and (ii) the outcomes on the basis of which they are assigned, is quite another.




3 Genealogy of the evolutionary paradigm
We are accustomed to the idea that the redness of a ripe tomato exists in our minds,
rather than in the physical world—the world described by physical theory. We find it
rather more difficult to accept that the same is true of the experiential now: it has no
counterpart in the physical world, in which we may qualify events or states of affairs
as past, present, or future relative to other events or states of affairs but cannot speak
of the past, the present, or the future. The proper view of physical reality is not only
what Nagel (1986) has called “the view from nowhere” but also what Price (1996) has
called “the view from nowhen”: the physical world does not contain a preferred time
corresponding to the particular moment (the present) at which I experience it. The idea
that some things exist not yet and others exist no longer is as true (phenomenologically
speaking) and as false (physically speaking) as the idea that a ripe tomato is red.
In a letter of condolence to the sister and the son of his lifelong friend Michele Besso,
Einstein wrote (Einstein and Besso, 1979): “For us believing physicists, the distinction
between past, present, and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion.” The fact that
this distinction cannot be grasped by science, was to Einstein a matter of painful but
inevitable resignation (Carnap, 1963). More recently the point was reiterated by Primas
(2003, original emphasis): “the concept of the “now”—the brief interval that divides
the past from the future—is absent in all fundamental mathematical formulations, both
in classical physics and in quantum physics. That is, in a context-independent ontic
description there is no physical basis for the distinction between past and future.”
In other words, if we introduce such a distinction into a physical theory, that theory
cannot offer a context-independent ontic description of a physical system. If it were
unavoidable to introduce such a distinction, there might be no alternative to the Bayesian
approach to quantum mechanics. Conversely, if we insist on the Bayesian approach, we
bar ourselves from arriving at a context-independent ontic description.
To treat our successive experience of the world as an objective feature of the world
is to project into the world (i) the singular phenomenological presence of the present
and (ii) the phenomenological arrow of time. The result is either of two seriously flawed
conceptions. We may think of the present as a three-dimensional hypersurface advancing
through four-dimensional spacetime.8 Or we may embrace the view called “presentism”,
7CFS claim that “the statement that an outcome is certain to occur is always a statement relative
to a scientist’s (necessarily subjective) state of belief. ‘It is certain’ is a state of belief, not a fact”. If
certainty is a state of belief, than all knowledge is a state of belief. This line of argument isn’t helpful.
8The flaw in this conception is that if we imagine a spatiotemporal whole as a simultaneous spatial
whole, then we cannot imagine this simultaneous spatial whole as persisting and the present as advancing
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according to which only the present is real.9 This leads to the well-known folk tale
according to which causal influences reach from the past to the future through persistent
“imprints” on the present. A no-longer-existing past can influence a not-yet-existing
future only through the mediation of something that persists. Causal influences reach
from the past into the future by being “carried through time” by something that “stays in
the present.” This evolving instantaneous state includes not only all presently possessed
properties but also traces of everything in the past that is causally relevant to the future.
In classical physics, this is how we come to conceive of “fields of force” that evolve
in time (and therefore, in a relativistic world, according to the principle of local action),
and that mediate between the past and the future.10 In quantum physics, this is how
we come to seize on algorithms that depend on the times of measurements, to construe
the time dependence of these algorithms as the time dependence of an evolving state,
and to conceive of this state as mediating the dependence of the probabilities of possible
outcomes on actual outcomes. We need such a mediating state as little as the Earth needs
a rope to keep the Moon from escaping.11
4 Unprepared quantum states: anything goes?
Whereas it is true that the “assumption that a preparation device can be given a complete
classical description neglects that any such device is quantum mechanical and thus cannot
be specified completely in terms of classical facts”, or that “[c]assical facts cannot suffice
to specify a preparation device completely because a complete description must ascribe
to the device an initial quantum state”, it does not follow that
through it. There is only one time, the fourth dimension of the spatiotemporal whole. There is not
another time in which this spatiotemporal whole persists as a spatial whole, and in which the present
advances. If the experiential now is anywhere in the spatiotemporal whole, it is trivially and vacuously
everywhere—or, rather, everywhen.
9The flaw in this conception is that simultaneity is a feature of the “language” we use to describe
a physical situation, rather than a feature of the situation itself. For any two events A, B there exist
two reference frames FA and FB and a third event C such that C is simultaneous with A in FA and
simultaneous with B in FB. Presentism is incompatible with this “simultaneity by proxy” of A with B.
10The calculation of classical electromagnetic effects, for instance, can be carried out in two steps:
given the distribution and motion of charges, we calculate a set of functions of position and time known
as the “electromagnetic field”, and using these functions, we calculate the electromagnetic effects that
these charges have on another charge. The rest (viz., that the electromagnetic field is a physical entity
in its own right, that it is locally generated by charges, that it mediates the action of charges on charges
by locally acting on itself, and that it locally acts on charges) is embroidery, in the sense that it adds
nothing whatsoever to the predictive power of the theory.
11If the synchronic (e.g., EPR-Bohm) correlations defy mediatory accounts, we have every reason to
be wary of mediatory accounts of the diachronic correlations. But this does not imply that quantum
states “represent the temporary and provisional beliefs a physicist holds as he travels down the road of
inquiry” (Fuchs and Schack, 2004).
9
• the prepared quantum state always depends on prior beliefs in the guise of a quan-
tum operation that describes the preparation device,
or that
• facts alone never determine a quantum state,
as CFS claim. In support of the first non sequitur, they consider a quantum circuit
containing a system qbit initially in the state α|0〉+β|1〉 and an “apparatus qbit” initially
in either |0〉 or |1〉. A controlled-NOT gate produces the entangled state α|00〉 + β|11〉.
A measurement of the apparatus qbit then flips the system qbit if the outcome is 1,
otherwise it does nothing. CFS go on to consider a circuit in which the measurement
device is replaced by a second c-NOT gate. This likewise prepares the system-qbit in the
state |0〉; in addition it leaves the apparatus qbit in the state α|0〉+β|1〉. This preparation
of the system qbit depends on the initial state of the apparatus qbit. If this is |1〉 instead
of |0〉, the system qbit is prepared in the state |1〉 and the apparatus qbit is left in the
state α|1〉 + β|0〉. Even if this shows that a prepared state can depend on the quantum
state of the preparation device (which I don’t think it does; see below), it does not show
that a prepared state necessarily depends on the quantum state of the preparation device.
The very circuit considered by CFS does, in fact, illustrate that a prepared state need
not depend on the quantum state of the preparation device. All we have to do is reverse
the roles of system and apparatus: the final system state, if elicited12 by means of a 1-qbit
measurement gate, reveals the prepared apparatus state irrespective of the system’s initial
state.
To dispose of the second non sequitur, we only need to consider the rule for updating
a density operator ρ1 upon obtaining an outcome that is represented by a projector Pˆ
(Franz, 1971):













〈v| = |v〉〈v|. (3)
In other words, the fact of having obtained the outcome represented by the projector |v〉〈v|
fully determines the quantum state |v〉〈v|—not, of course, as a physical state that obtains
at any time whatsoever, but as the right algorithm for assigning probabilities to the
possible outcomes of whichever measurement may be performed next.13
12I felicitate CFS on their choice of “eliciting” in place of “ascertaining”.
13Subsequent to their (6.7), which is equivalent to (2) above, Fuchs and Schack (2004) assert, wrongly,
that if “the quantum operation associated with a measurement device is an objective fact (i.e., of the
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With an implicit bow to the evolutionary paradigm, CFS maintain that the pre-
measurement system-apparatus state arises from a unitary interaction between the sys-
tem and the apparatus (i.e., a unitary transformation resulting in correlations between
outcomes of measurements performed on the system and outcomes of measurements per-
formed on the apparatus), and that we cannot know the output of this transformation
without knowing the input (i.e., the initial quantum state of all systems concerned). At
least in the special case of a pure state preparation, this input is irrelevant to the system’s
post-measurement state, as we have just seen.
CFS further state that “two agents starting from the same facts, but different priors,
arrive at different (posterior) state assignments”. The question of how much state as-
signments can differ has been addressed by Brun et al. (2002), who showed that several
density matrices are mutually compatible if and only if the supports of all them have at





pi |vi〉〈vi|, pi > 0 (4)
with at least one state common to all expansions. It follows at once that two pure-state
density matrices are compatible if and only if they are identical.
Brun et al. define a set of density matrices to be compatible when there could be
circumstances under which they would represent the knowledge different people have of
one and the same physical system. Caves et al. (2002b), who call the belief that an
outcome is impossible a “firm belief”, have shown that this definition of compatibility is
equivalent to the existence of a density operator that does not contradict the firm beliefs
of any party. Any weaker compatibility condition will therefore admit of situations in
which no such density operator can be found. In such a situation, any density operator
contradicts someone’s belief that an outcome is impossible (i.e., it assigns a probability
greater than 0 to at least one outcome to which at least one party assigns probability 0).
Such a situation does not arise, or so I will argue.
Given that quantum mechanics concerns correlations between measurement outcomes,
and thus has no truck with absolute probabilities, there is no such thing as an unprepared
quantum state. Only if the dependence of a quantum state on the time of a measurement
is construed as the time dependence of an evolving state of some kind, does the notion of
an unprepared quantum state arise. And if there is such a thing, then the best bet may
same nature as the measurement outcome), then so too must be the posterior quantum state” |v〉〈v|.
A quantum operation and a measurement outcome are of the same nature in that both are objective.
Whereas the latter is an objective fact, the former is an objective law that serves to transform one
quantum state into another. None of this implies that a quantum state is an objective fact. The converse
non sequitur is to assume that quantum states are not objective facts and to conclude that therefore the
quantum operator that leads to |v〉〈v| cannot be an objective fact. It may not be an objective fact, but
it certainly can be an objective transformation law.
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well be CFS’s interpretation of the same as a prior belief whose truth value cannot be
ascertained.
But this does not mean that “anything goes”. If neither Bob nor Alice have any
information whatever regarding the initial state of the apparatus qbit in the abovemen-
tioned circuit, yet Bob believes that that state is |0〉 whereas Alice believes that it is
|1〉, then Bob will conclude that the circuit prepares the system in the state |0〉, whereas
Alice believes that the system is prepared in the state |1〉. CFS seem to believe that this
illustrates that “[f]or sufficiently divergent priors, the two agents might even legitimately
assign different pure states”.14
Legitimately? No way! If neither Bob nor Alice know the initial state of the apparatus
qbit, the only legitimate belief about it is the totally mixed state that represents either
agent’s complete lack of information. It simply cannot happen that “two agents who agree
on all the facts relevant to a quantum experiment can disagree on the state assignments”,
for in addition to all relevant facts (measurement outcomes) the agents have nothing to
go by but their identical ignorance.
Last but not least, an “apparatus qbit” is a contradiction in terms. To minimally
qualify as a measurement device, a system must have at least three mutually orthogonal
states—a neutral state and at least two alternative outcome-indicating states. To fully
qualify as a measurement device, the classical description of an outcome-indicating state
must unequivocally specify the indicated outcome. Unless the exact quantum state of the
device in an outcome-indicating states is irrelevant to the indicated outcome, the system
does not qualify as a measurement device.
5 Why probability?
Once it is agreed that “probabilities are single-case, or nothing” (Appleby, 2005b), or
that the mathematical theory of probability relies on a primitive notion of probability to
make contact with reality15 (Appleby, 2006), or that probability is the quantification of
the primitive notion of possibility (Go¨rnitz, et al., 1992), what we ought to be worrying
about is why we use probabilities, not what they are.
One reason why we use probabilities is ignorance. This is not—at any rate, not in
general—the case with quantum-mechanical probabilities. “Quantum mechanics is the
14On the other hand, “[t]he quantum de Finetti theorem. . . guarantees for two independent observers—
as long as they have a rather minimal agreement in their initial beliefs—that the outcomes of a sufficiently
informative set of measurements will force a convergence in their state assignments for the remaining
systems (Schack, et al., 2001). This ‘minimal’ agreement is characterized by a judgment on the part of
both parties that the sequence of systems is exchangeable” (Fuchs and Schack, 2004) or—in common
parlance—that the systems are identically prepared.
15In much the same way the physical theory of spacetime relies on primitive notions of time and space
to make contact with reality.
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first example in human experience where probabilities play an essential role even when
there is nothing to be ignorant about” (Mermin, 1998). So why does quantum mechanics
reduce us to predicting probabilities? What has taken the place of ignorance? The answer
to these questions ought to be formulated in objective language, referring to (i) the factual
(the objective measurement outcomes to which, and on the basis of which, probabilities
are assigned) and (ii) the nomic (the objective correlation laws of quantum mechanics).
What has taken the place of subjective ignorance is an objective fuzziness, which is
not easily descried as long as the measurement problem remains safely locked away into
“a single black-boxed piece of hardware: the 1-Qbit measurement gate” (Mermin, 2006).
Nor does it seem possible to discern its place in the real world without reference to the
constituents of this world, whatever they may be. (One thing is certain: they are not
quantum-computational gates.)
Suppose that there are particles so stable that we cannot distinguish their lifetimes
from infinity. And suppose that there are particles so small that we cannot distinguish
their volumes from 0. Let B be a particle that falls in both of these categories. Further
suppose that relative positions can be attributed to pairs of particles. Having made these
suppositions, we are in a position (i) to define and quantify “objective fuzziness” and
(ii) to discern its place in the real world.
Imagine the space E of exact positions (representable by triplets of real numbers)
relative to some reference object A. Accept the fact that no measurement can be made
with infinite precision, and define the possible outcomes of a measurement of the position
of B relative to A by means of a finite partition {Ri|i = 1, . . . , n} of E . Let pi be the
probability of finding B in Ri, and suppose that pi is assigned on the basis of all relevant
measurement outcomes. Saying that the position of B relative to A is fuzzy—objectively
fuzzy—is the same as saying that there is a sufficiently finegrained finite partition {Ri}
such that pi > 0 for at least two regions Ri. As for quantifying the fuzziness of B’s
position relative to A, this is readily done in terms of the moments about the mean of
the distribution {pi}.
Thus probabilities serve to define and quantify fuzzy measurable quantities. But why
are some, if not all, measurable quantities fuzzy? One way to answer this question is to
point to the existence of objects that
• have spatial extent (they “occupy” space),
• appear to be made of finite numbers of objects without (or with negligible) spatial
extent,
• and are stable (they don’t collapse or explode as soon as they are created).
The existence of such objects crucially involves not only the fuzziness of their internal
relative positions but also that of their internal momenta (Mohrhoff, 2006b). This tells
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us what fuzzy positions and fuzzy momenta are “good for”. I leave it as an exercise for
the reader to determine what such objects might in their turn be good for.
6 Particles
How are particles related to (i) the laws of correlation between value-indicating events
(“measurements”) and (ii) the value-indicating events? CFS may be happy to learn that
I attribute the undefinability of the values of unmeasured observables emphasized by
Bohr (Petersen, 1968; Jammer, 1974) to the nonexistence of such values: to be is to be
measured. In this sense, the properties of the “microworld” supervene on value-indicating
events. Since I am committed to phrasing my answers in terms of value-indicating events
and their quantum-mechanical correlations, I cannot but look upon particles as more
or less abiding correlations between “detector clicks”, to the likely disappointment of
Appleby:
The day I become convinced that physics does not in fact provide us with
anything more than procedures for predicting detector “clicks” will be the
day I abandon physics in favour of some more stimulating activity. (Appleby,
2006)
But stay with me, Marcus, all is not lost.
Suppose that we perform a series of position measurements, and that every position
measurement yields exactly one outcome (i.e., each time exactly one detector clicks).
Then we have a conservation law, and we are entitled to infer the existence of an entity O
which persists through time, to think of the clicks given off by the detectors as indicating
the successive positions of this entity, to think of the behavior of the detectors as position
measurements, and to think of the detectors as detectors.
If each time exactly two detectors click, then we are entitled to infer the existence of
two entities which persist through time. Or are we? If there isn’t another conservation law
effectively providing the entities with identity tags, then the question of which (particle
detected at t1) is which (particle detected at t2), has no answer. In other words, it is
meaningless. Here as elsewhere in science, the challenge is to learn to think in ways that
do not lead to meaningless questions. What we have in this case is a single system or
entity having the property of being in two places every time we “check”. Observe that
the meaningless question “which is which?” can no longer be asked. A system “made
up” of two things is one thing; one thing having the property of being in two places every
time we check is quite another.
Let’s get relativistic. Initially we have mj particles of type j (j = 1, . . . ,M) in certain
places or with certain momenta, and the next thing we know is that we have nk particles
of type k (k = 1, . . . , N) in certain places or with certain momenta. What we have in
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these cases is a single system or entity (or whatever) having the property of being in any
number of places or moving with any number of momenta—each “instance” carrying the
insignia of some kind of particle—every time we check. Should we say that almost any
congeries of particles can turn into almost any congeries of particles (subject to constraints
imposed by the quantum-mechanical correlation laws)? Or should we not rather say that
this single system or entity can manifest itself as almost any congeries of particles every
time we check?
Now consider a particle lacking internal relations. What is it “in itself”, out of relation
to its external relations? The answer is: nothing, except possibly a substance lacking
properties.16 For the elicitable properties of particles are either kinematical relations
such as positions or momenta, or they are parameters characterizing dynamical relations
such as the various kinds of charge, or they have an objective significance independent of
conventions only as dimensionless ratios (e.g., mass ratios).17
According to a philosophical principle known as “the identity of indiscernibles”, A and
B are one and the same thing just in case there is no difference between A and B. Not
only is there no difference between two particles lacking internal relations considered
“in themselves”, but nothing real corresponds to the distinction we make between this
particle and that particle over and above the distinction between this property and that
property.18 What follows from this is the numerical identity of all particles lacking internal
relations, considered by themselves. If we think of particles lacking internal relations as
the “ultimate constituents of matter”, then there is a clear sense in which the number of
“ultimate constituents of matter” equals 1.
Here is what we have found: (i) A quantum system is always one; the number of its
so-called “constituents” is simply one of its elicitable properties. (ii) The true number of
ultimate constituents is 1.
If I permit myself to think of the entire physical world as a quantum system and to
ask about its constituents, I find that it has just one—a single intrinsically propertyless
substance—and I am in a position to account for the origin of both matter and space: by
entering into spatial relations with itself, this single intrinsically propertyless substance
gives rise to space, conceived of as the totality of spatial relations, and it gives rise to
matter, conceived of as the corresponding apparent totality of relata—“apparent” because
16Whereas a property is that in the world to which a logical or grammatical predicate can refer, a
substance is that in the world to which only a logical or grammatical subject can refer.
17Spin is both relational (insofar as its components are defined relative a reference frame) and char-
acteristic of dynamical relations (insofar as it controls the effect on a particle’s momentum probability
distribution in the presence of an electric current). The use of “dynamical” is not an endorsement of
the notion of quantum state evolution but a reference to the dependence of probabilities on the times of
measurements.
18This is the same as saying that in the absence of properties that can serve as identity tags, there is
no answer to the question “Which is which?”.
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the relations are self -relations.
But how can I possibly think of the entire physical world as a quantum system? Didn’t
I claim something to the effect that no property is a possessed property unless it is an
elicited/indicated/measured property? If the entire physical world is a quantum system,
then who or what is doing the eliciting/indicating/measuring? To answer this question,
we need a new concept, or else we need to think about an old concept in a new way.
7 The macroworld
Two observations, to begin with.
(1) Whereas no object ever has a sharp position (relative to any other object), some
objects have the sharpest positions in existence. (In a non-relativistic world this is so
because the exact localization of a particle implies an infinite momentum dispersion
and hence an infinite mean energy. In a relativistic world the attempt to produce
a strictly localized particle results instead in the production of particle-antiparticle
pairs.)
(2) The possibility of obtaining evidence of the departure of an object O from its classi-
cally predictable position calls for detectors whose position probability distributions
are narrower than O’s—detectors that can probe the region over which O’s fuzzy
position extends. [A “classically predictable position” is a position that can be
predicted on the basis of (i) a classical law of motion and (ii) all relevant value-
indicating events.]
For an object of the kind mentioned under (1), the existence of a detector of the kind
mentioned under (2) is unlikely. For such objects, the probability of obtaining evidence
of departures from the classically predictable motion is very low. Hence among these
objects there will be many of which the following is true: every one of their indicated
positions is consistent with every prediction that can be made on the basis of previously
indicated properties and a classical law of motion. These are the objects that deserve
to be labeled “macroscopic”. To permit a macroscopic object to indicate a measurement
outcome, one exception has to be made: its position may change unpredictably if and
when it serves to indicate an outcome.
The macroworld consists of the relative positions between macroscopic objects—
“macroscopic positions” for short. Macroscopic positions are not manifestly fuzzy: by
definition, they never evince their fuzziness (through departures from classically predicted
values). Since the supervenience of the properties of the “microworld” on value-indicating
events is a consequence of their fuzziness,19 this makes it legitimate to attribute to the
19If all observables have definite values at all times, measurements can be thought of as revealing
pre-existing values.
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macroworld—not individually to each macroscopic position but to the macroworld in its
entirety, and not merely “for all practical purposes” but strictly—a free-standing reality
(i.e., a reality independent of anything external to it). And this makes it possible to
reconcile the following assertions:
• The ultimate constituent of the world is a single intrinsically propertyless substance
which, by entering into relations with itself, originates both matter and space.
• The properties of the “microworld” supervene on the goings-on in the macroworld.
The free-standing macroworld contains the value-indicating events—on which the proper-
ties of the “microworld” supervene—as unpredictable changes in the values of macroscopic
positions. Whereas the “microworld”, therefore, does not constitute the macroworld,
that single intrinsically propertyless substance does. What, then, is the so-called “mi-
croworld”? Where or how does it fit in? What is its roˆle? This is how the measurement
problem presents itself to me.
8 Manifestation
This problem can be solved, I propose, by resurrecting a time-honored ontology: ulti-
mately there exists a One Being, of which the world is a manifestation. The question,
then, is how this One Being manifests itself or the world, and quantum mechanics sug-
gests an answer. The manifested world is the macroworld. The “microworld” is neither a
world nor a part of any world (hence the shudder quotes) but instrumental in the man-
ifestation of the (macro)world. Quantum mechanics affords us a glimpse “behind” the
manifested world at formless particles, non-visualizable atoms, and partly visualizable
molecules which, instead of being the world’s constituent parts or structures, are instru-
mental in its manifestation. But—and this is the punchline—we cannot describe what lies
“behind” the manifested world except in terms of the finished product—the manifested
world.
To see why this is so, imagine that you experience something the like of which you
never experienced before. How are you going to describe it? You are obliged to use
words that refer to experiences you have had. It is the same with the manifestation—qua
process rather than result. Only, what is missing in this case is not merely the words.
The reason for the supervenience of the “microscopic” on the macroscopic is not merely
a lack of descriptive terms but a lack of attributable properties.
Let me give an example. We tend to think of space as an intrinsically divided expanse,
which is to say as something that has parts. Hence if we imagine an object and a part or
region of space, we tend to think that this object—at any rate, its center of mass—has
to be either inside or outside that region. In reality, a region of space only exists if,
and to the extent that, it is physically realized—made real—for instance by being the
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sensitive region of a (necessarily macroscopic) detector. To be able to say truthfully that
a particle is inside a certain region, we need a detector not merely for indicating the
particle’s presence inside that region. In the first place, the detector is needed in order
that that region be real and the property of being in it be available for attribution to the
particle.
9 Objective probability
Contrary to what CFS have claimed, there are several good reasons for thinking of
quantum-mechanical probability assignments as objective:20
• They are based on objective, value-indicating events and objective physical laws.
(This does not imply that a quantum state is anything more than a tool for convert-
ing value-indicating events into probabilities of possible measurement outcomes.)
• They play an essential role in the description of physics reality, even when there is
nothing to be ignorant about.
• They may involve but do not reduce to Bayesian degrees of belief. (The stability of
the hydrogen atom rests on the objective fuzziness of its internal relative position
and momentum, not on anyone’s belief about the values of these quantities.)
• They are needed to define and quantify an objective fuzziness.
Of all these reasons, the last appears to me to be the most compelling.
Before concluding I want to address a fairly typical argument against “the folly of
trying to have two kinds of probabilities in quantum mechanics” (Fuchs and Schack,
2004). The general state of a spin-1
2
particle can be written in terms of the Pauli matrices




(I + S · σ), (5)





pj |nj〉〈nj| , (6)
where |nj| = 1 and {pj} is a probability distribution. Fuchs and Schack are under
the impression that we are to regard the probabilities pj (which in one decomposition
may equal 3/4 and 1/4, respectively, and in another may each equal 1/2) “as subjective
expressions of ignorance about which eigenstate is the ‘true’ state of the particle”. Having
20I agree, though, that there are (also) bad reasons, e.g., the statistical interpretation of quantum
mechanics, the frequentist interpretation of probability, and the propensity interpretation of (quantum-
mechanical) probability assignments.
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demonstrated the (obvious) folly of this impression, they conclude that “if a density
operator is even partially a reflection of one’s state of belief, the multiplicity of ensemble
decomposition means that a pure state must also be a state of belief.”
Fuchs and Schack arrive at this conclusion by ignoring that the probabilities pj in
a decomposition
∑
j pj |nj〉〈nj| are ignorance probabilities if and only if a measurement
with the possible outcomes |nj〉〈nj| has been made yet its outcome has not been taken into
account. In this case the decomposition of ρ is uniquely determined by that measurement,
and there is no ambiguity whatever about which probabilities are grounded in subjective
ignorance and which are grounded in objective fuzziness. If, on the other hand, ρ reflects
a situation in which all relevant facts are taken into account, we are still dealing with a
probability algorithm that can be written in different ways as a probability distribution
over probability algorithms, but now there is no kind of basis for the distinction between
subjective and objective contributions. Since all relevant measurement outcomes are
taken into account, the probabilities assigned by ρ are objective in the advertised sense.
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